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Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 4, No. 3, 349-374 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/1740468107083249

Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons?

John Broome

Corpus Christi College Oxford, UK, john.broome{at}philosophy.ox.ac.uk

Some philosophers think that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons, or alternatively in responding correctly to beliefs about reasons. This paper considers various possible interpretations of `responding correctly to reasons' and of `responding correctly to beliefs about reasons', and concludes that rationality consists in neither, under any interpretation. It recognizes that, under some interpretations, rationality does entail responding correctly to beliefs about reasons. That is: necessarily, if you are rational you respond correctly to your beliefs about reasons.

Key Words: akrasia • enkrasia • rationality • reasons


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